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Abstract: This paper studies the extent to which social capital drives performance in 
the Chinese venture capital (VC) market and explores the trend toward VC syndication 
in China. First, we propose a hybrid model based on syndicated social networks and 
the latent-variable model, which describes the social capital at VC firms and builds 
relationships between social capital and performance at VC firms. Then, we build three 
hypotheses about the relationships and test the hypotheses using our proposed model. 
Some numerical simulations are given to support the test results. Finally, we show that 
the correlations between social capital and financial performance at VC firms are weak 
in China and find that China’s VC firms lack mature social capital links.  
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In recent years, the number of venture capital (VC) firms that repeatedly turn to 
fundraising and investment to finance their projects by co-investing has grown rapidly 
(Aizenman and Kendall 2012; Guller and Guillén 2010; Meuleman and Wright 2011). 
Over the past two decades, many VC firms have leveraged their prominence to build 
co-investment networks (Dai et al. 2012; Jääskeläinen and Maula 2014). Using these 
networks, they aim to access higher investment returns and broader diversification 
opportunities in financial markets. Co-investment by different venture capitalists not 
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only helps to establish the VC industry but also increases the rate of success of their 
projects (Rosiello et al., 2011). 
In China, the VC industry has been developing for more than 20 years and 
especially rapidly in recent years. In particular, cooperation through co-investment, 
which is an investment strategy of VC institutions to diversify risk, share resources, 
and share value, has become an important method of investment in China to enhance 
investment performance. By retaining a significant degree of ownership after the firms 
in which they invest go public, VC firms can continue their monitoring role, which 
further accelerates the growth and performance of those recipient firms. The literature, 
however, shows that VC activities are conducted in a markedly different way in China 
from elsewhere. Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003) argue that this is because the institutional 
environment in China is different from that in the West. For example, weak 
enforcement of investor protections and poor corporate governance in China might 
reduce VC firms’ incentives to act in the interests of investors (Bruton and Ahlstrom 
2003; Lu et al. 2013). The institutional differences in China can lead to underpricing 
and different long-run performance outcomes. As in the literature, we define the social 
capital of each VC firm as everything that it leverages in its own resources to build co-
investment networks. Also, the literature shows that different characteristics at VC 
firms affect the recipient firms’ performance and that startup firms choose specific VC 
firms in order to signal their quality and reduce the information asymmetry between 
those recipient firms and other market participants (Cumming et al. 2006; Hsu 2004). 
But the development of co-investment has been relatively slow in recent years, which 
attracted our attention. The question of whether China’s unique legal system and 
cultural background of co-investment can help to improve performance is one worth 
studying. 
The motivation for our study is to test whether social capital at VC firms affects 
their investment performance. First, this study employs the social network method to 
describe the social capital of venture capital. Then, using a two-node network built by 
VSs and their co-investment projects, we discuss the contribution of a network of the 
projecting to VCs’ part in a two-node network. We use a latent-variable model to test 
the effects of the social capital of venture capital on the success of venture capital in 
China. Unlike in classical research modeling performance and networks (Hochberg et 
al. 2007, 2010), we employ a latent-variable model with social capital: we did not 
consider what social capital includes, just what it represents in a network. This makes 
sense because the topic of this paper is the characteristics of China’s VC, not the social 
capital of VC in general. 
First, this study contributes to the literature by enhancing understanding of the 
corporate relationship between financial performance and the social capital of venture 
capital in China. Using social network attributes and other information, we test the 
latent-variable model to test our hypothesis. Second, the paper contributes new 
evidence regarding the investment phenomenon of venture capital in China. Finally, we 
offer some analyses and suggestions regarding venture capital in China. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we give some 
background on venture capital and financial reporting in China. Then we review related 
literature, develop our hypotheses, and test our model. Sample data and descriptive 
statistics are presented in the following section, and then the statistical results are 
discussed. Finally, we present our conclusions. 
 
Venture Capital and Financial Reporting in China 
According to reports from the Zero2IPO, 597 VC funds were added in China, with 
30,700,000 dollars in new capital, 12in 2015 . New investment was made in 3,554 
ventures and the scale of investment reached about 20 billion dollars in 2015. 
Investment is booming thanks to a policy of fiscal stimulus and extensive government 
spending, and the Chinese government recognizes VC investment as a vital way to 
support small companies and support economic growth. Indeed, unlike in mature 
markets, in which stimulus packages are usually market oriented, with well-designed 
mechanisms to assist in their implementation, in emerging markets, stimulus packages 
are often more intended to benefit SOEs and other state-controlled entities, rather than 
benefiting private firms. This is especially the case in China, where the government still 
controls a large number of firms and the banking system, which raises the question of 
whether Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises 
(non-SOEs) have equal access to the increased funding for bank loans and investment 
opportunities. For example, Leary (2009) indicates that, following an expansion 
(contraction) in the supply of bank loans, the ratio of bank loans to small, bank-
dependent firms significantly increases (decreases) relative to that of large, less bank-
dependent firms, because small, bank-dependent firms are less likely to switch between 
public and private debt markets. Lemmon and Roberts (2010) show that net debt 
issuances decline significantly after a contraction in the supply of bank credit. Shen et 
al. (2015) find that the economic stimulus package in China leads to better access to 
bank loans for large firms or SOEs than for small firms or privately owned firms. The 
investment made by Chinese firms come to a new development stage, after the 
implementation of the stimulus package, and private capital has become the main 
source of venture capital. 
 
 
   Figure 1. The incremental capital raised by VC institutions in China. 
Note: The left-hand y-axis is the value of incremental capital raised, in billions of 
dollars; the right-hand y-axis is the percentage of VC syndication, by percentage of 
projects.  
Figure 1 shows that in general the percentage of projects with VC syndication 
gradually decreased after the 2008 financial crisis. Despite the trend toward 
globalization, business cycles in industrialized countries and emerging Asian 
economies have so far remained largely independent of each other. This is referred to 
in the recent literature as a decoupling of business cycles (Akin and Kose 2008). 
Nevertheless, recent developments since the onset of the global financial crisis in the 
second half of 2008 also show that these countries are not autonomous. The 
International Monetary Fund (Akin and Kose 2008) argues that the current slowdown 
in the world economy could have a significantly larger impact on Asian economies than 
earlier global downturns because of their more extensive trade and financial integration, 
especially with the US. Furthermore, Hong et al. (2009) show in their historical analysis 
that earlier worldwide financial crises often had overwhelming impacts on Asian 
economies. Thus, the decline in the percentage of syndication may also be affected by 
the financial crisis. For risk control purposes, VC firms have become more careful and 
take a longer time to exit, thus their investment decisions have changed. Some small 
0%
9%
18%
27%
36%
45%
0.
55.
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Capital raised Percent of syndicate
reverses appear in the years when a large amount of capital was raised (for political 
reasons). These reverses may have been caused by the excessive capital invested in 
high-risk projects, so VC firms syndicate to lower their risk. VC in joint investments is 
a hot issue and has many advantages, but the decline in VC syndication in China is 
inconsistent with the theoretical conclusion. Co-investment in China does not seem to 
be guided by rules about how syndicate members are chosen, and VC firms selecting a 
VC partner have a wide range of technologies, a wide range of information, industry 
expertise, and investment networks. Is VC syndication useful in China? Why is the 
percentage of syndicated projects declining? 
 
Prior Research and Development of Hypotheses 
 
Social capital describes the ability of individuals or groups to access resources 
embedded in their social network. Social capital can enrich other forms of capital, such 
as favors (human capital) or new information (intellectual capital). Lin et al. (2001) 
defines social capital as “investment in social relations with expected returns in the 
marketplace.” In this framework, social capital is the creation of social interactions and 
the expectation of future social resources. The function of social capital is split into 
“bridging” and “bonding,” which describe resources embedded in different types of 
relationships. The ties that connect different clusters within a network, often referred to 
as “bridging” ties, help propagate novel information across those groups. As explained 
below, bridging ties are more likely to be weaker ties and thus provide access to novel 
information and diverse perspectives. Stronger ties are multiple iterative interactions 
and higher levels of trust, support, and intimacy. These ties typically provide access to 
more substantive forms of capital conversion associated with bonded social capital. 
Facebook networks contain both strong and weak ties (Bakshy et al. 2012). Because 
individuals often use multiple channels to communicate with strong ties and fewer 
channels to interact with weaker ties, the focus of this study is on bridging social capital 
because we are interested in how Facebook enables greater access to resources held by 
weaker ties, which may not be available through other channels.  
VC firms have a social capital network, which is of great help to enterprises. 
Indigenous VC energizes the construction of social relations networks (Pruthi et al. 
2003), which play a role similar to that of VC as the representative of the financing side 
and enterprise ecosphere. Basalp (2011) constructs a network model of the science and 
technology park; they finds in the establishment of a cooperative, innovation and 
information communication network in the process of playing an intermediary role. The 
number of partners does not affect the corresponding social capital. Recent research on 
social capital extends to the meso-structure of relationship networks among firms. 
Block et al. (2012), using data analysis find that the social capital structure and 
relationship of VC firms have significantly effects on VC financing for startups. The 
exchange of social capital within the network plays a significant role in shaping the 
network’s structure (Jackson et al. 2012). From the perspective of enterprises, the 
allocation of social capital and network structure directly enables enterprises to obtain 
financial resources, which reflects enterprises’ information dissemination in the VC 
network (Chakir 2013).  Alexy et al. (2012) believe that the social capital possessed 
by venture capitalists allows them to obtain superior access to information about 
investment. According to Javakhadze et al. (2016), social capital will reduce the 
negative impact of incomplete information and agency problems and affect external 
finance and cash flow as well as external finance and Tobin’Q sensitivities 
A VC co-investment network is formed out of a pattern of social capital exchange 
between VC firms and projects. Wilson (1968) define an investment alliance as “a 
group of independent decision makers who make common decisions in an uncertain 
situation and share a common benefit” ( p.119) . The motivation and effect of joint 
investment are the two main areas of VC cooperation. Joint investment has various 
motivations. The value-added hypothesis holds that different VC firms, with different 
management skills, can increase the value of the investment. The joint investment 
choice hypothesis posits that the co-investment gains advantage if many uncorrelated 
VC firms evaluate the same project (Casamatta and Haritchabalet 2007). There are also 
many other hypotheses, such as those on decentralized financial risk, information 
sharing and potential investment opportunities, social structural factors, and window 
dressing (Lockeett and Wright 2001). Previous research proves the relationship 
between social capital and social networks. But joint investment networks consists of 
firms and projects need to be transformed into a VC firm-VC firm form, so that a social 
network analysis method can be used to construct the network consist of like elements 
(firm to firm), not different ones (firm to project). Evidence on VC networks shows that 
the more central the location of a network, the greater the advantage in interaction and 
the higher the VC firm’s performance (Checkley 2014; Tastan 2013).  
 
Hypotheses and methodology 
Most studies employ non-network methods to analyze social capital. A VC 
syndication network can be used to measure social capital. The structural hole of VC 
firms represents the power and opportunity of social capital. The closer the network 
between the VC firms is, the more obvious the network characteristics are, and the more 
obvious the network effect of cooperation is, the better the embedded network. 
Resources can flow smoothly (through shorter paths) between VC firms. For individual 
venture capitalists, the resources and advantages of other venture capitalists comprise 
social capital.  
Hypothesis 1: The higher the network embeddedness index and the structural 
hole index of VC institutions, the higher the social capital of VC firms. 
Outside China, most VC firms are independent, they pursue financial returns, and 
their success can be measured by their financial performance. However, for corporate 
VC firms, financial returns are not the only or even the primary goal; rather, they may 
be seeking the completion of an initial public offering or an acquisition at an attractive 
price, so an initial public offering (IPO) is a measure of failure, rather than success 
(Gompers and Lerner 2000). Due to the emerging firms’ high Price-Earnings Ratio, an 
IPO is much more profitable than a merger or a buyout in China. Even for corporate 
VC firms, going public is a kind of success, as long as projects are operated 
independently. IPO exits of VC firms often achieve higher exit returns than other exit 
ways such as merger and acquisition, management buy-outs. It is widely accepted that 
the higher a firm’s proportion of IPO exits, the higher the firm’s returns on its VC exit. 
When VC has a higher exit ratio, the financial gains will be higher. This means VC is 
closer to obtain a better performance. 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the financial returns, the higher the performance of the 
VC firm. 
Many researchers have shown that social capital through social networks creates 
channels for the flow of information and plays an important role in portfolio and 
market participation (Cohen et al. 2008; Fafchamps, 2007; Hochberg et al. 2007). 
Therefore, social capital has an important impact on corporate finance, especially 
external financing, while trust can effectively operate in economic entities and reduce 
transaction costs (Javakhadze et al. 2016). Social capital can also increase economic 
efficiency and encourage economic entities to build reputations for good-faith trading 
through a reputation-loss disciplinary mechanism (McMillan and Woodruff 2000). 
If the VC network really has meaning, as in the previous literature, network 
embeddedness is helpful for VC investment and value-added services. Thus the 
project is more likely to succeed. As the resources obtained through the network can 
be defined as social capital, the more abundant the social capital is, the more 
successful the VC investment project will be. The higher the project success ratio and 
the more successful the project is, the more successful the VC institution will be. The 
idea of social capital supports VC success, not project success; VC success may not 
be the only measure of project success but, rather, more projects, more stable returns, 
and so forth. The motivation for our study is to test whether the social capital of VC 
firms affects the success of projects in which they invest. Therefore, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The greater the social capital of VC firms, the better their 
performance is. 
Based on this logic, we can study how social capital affects VC success using the 
latent-variable model. First, as Figure 2 shows, the relationship between VC firms and 
projects is described using a two-node social network (bipartite network). Bipartite 
networks have two node types, such that two nodes can be linked only if they are of 
different types. More precisely, the network has two dimensions: VC and the project. 
As the special and determined choices of each VC firm, VC and projects are linked by 
different connections. 
 Figure 2. Sketch of joint investment two-node social network. 
Second, studying the VC social capital network relies on a network model of the 
second node. This model consists of two classes of nodes: participants and events. In 
this study, the participants in the network are VC institutions, and the events are venture 
capitalists. Generally, to obtain the one part’s attribute, mapping to a one-node network 
for analyze is a useful method. As shown in Figure 3, projecting to the VC part, we 
obtain the VC syndication network.  
 
Figure 3. Structure of the VC network 
Then we use a social network analysis (SNA) to obtain social capital variables and 
calculate VC firms’ financial performance. Centrality, as measured in SNA, indicates 
how network is connected, and constraint indicate the structural holes in network that 
are all traditional social capital measures. Degree is a local centrality measure, while 
closeness and betweenness are global centrality measures. Some social capital, like 
physical resources, will not exceed social ties, but information will come much farther, 
and the network location is time related. They are node-level characteristics, a VC’s 
direct benefit (embeddedness) and indirect benefit (structural holes) from network 
embeddedness. Scale and return are included in financial performance. Scale is the 
result of VC financing and may influence future financing. 
Finally, we use the latent-space approach to model social capital and VC 
performance over time. We investigate how social capital affects performance in the 
following latent-variable model: 
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where , , ,i i    are coefficients and i  are error terms.  
Indeed, latent-variable models go beyond ordinary regression models to 
incorporate multiple independent and dependent variables as well as hypothetical latent 
constructs that clusters of observed variables might represent. This approach uses the 
idea that to test the specified set of relationships among observed and latent variables 
as a whole and allows theoretical testing even when experiments are not possible. For 
social capital, the latent variables of social network features are described for VC, 
which means that the social capital of VC is in their social networks. In this paper, we 
use the degree of weight, closeness, betweenness, and structural holes as observed 
variables of VC. An additional important aspect of our model is VC performance. We 
similarly use the observed variables of financial returns and only financial returns as 
permanent VC. Separating the relationship between latent variables, we build an 
equation of two latent variables: social capital and performance. In addition, we do not 
include industry concentration, professionalization, VC lifetime, etc., which are part of 
social capital and represented in social networks. In this model, we are not concerned 
about what social capital is, only what it represents in networks. The performance is 
pure financial performance, not including accumulation of social capital. 
To test our three hypotheses, we construct four latent-variable models, in which 
the model described above is Model 1, and Models 2, 3, and 4 control for a structural 
hole variable, variables for both inward investment and outward investment, and the 
three variables mentioned above, respectively.  
Data  
The data are collected from Qingke and Wind, which are leading financial 
information providers in China. The sample period is from 2000 to 2015. First, as Table 
2 shows, we obtained the data from Zdatabase disclosed from 2000 to 2015 for 4,985 
VC firms, 21,421 enterprises with VC investment, and 40,882 investment events in 
China, omitting undisclosed data.  
Certain investments may be more or less uncertain to different VC firms, based on 
the extent of their prior experience in the specific industry of the investment. We thus 
focus on a hitherto unexplored, relational aspect of uncertainty that is inherent in a 
particular VC firm–investment dyad and reflects the VC firm’s understanding of the 
particular company and its environment. In view of this, the need and opportunity to 
syndicate a particular investment may not always be aligned: in certain situations— 
such as when the investment is novel for the VC firm—the factors that increase the 
firm’s need to seek partners may also reduce the firm’s opportunity to find and attract 
needed partners. Such a misalignment is related to the presence of two different types 
of uncertainty. On the one hand, a VC firm faces (egocentric) uncertainty related to the 
proper decisions to be made in selecting and managing these investments. In these 
cases, the firm can benefit from the participation of syndicate partners and is thus likely 
to seek such partners. Yet, on the other hand, for these very same investments, it is 
difficult for potential syndicate partners to evaluate the focal VC firm as a worthy 
partner (altercentric uncertainty). In these cases, the opportunity for syndication is 
contingent upon the VC firm’s ability to signal its quality to potential partners, such as 
through its status and reputation. Thus, we divided the experiment into two situations: 
same-round investment and different-round investment, so we can separate the effects 
of the uncertainty caused by investment and compare performance under weak 
conditions. 
We model social networks, in which raw data is modeled into a “two-node” 
network and then transformed into a “one-node” network. Thus, by modeling joint 
investment events into two-node networks, we construct a “same-round model” by 
considering joint investment as two VC firms sharing a common finance round, which 
means that VC firms meet and discuss terms directly with the companies they are 
funding. In the same-round model, VC firms have a strong relationship in the network, 
and their prices, costs, and benefits are all the same. We also construct a “different-
round model” by considering joint investment as two VC investments by the same 
company, which mean VC firms are all shareholders or even board members of the 
same company, so their interests are same but the relationships are weaker than in the 
“same-round model” and contain both “strong ties” and “weak ties.”  
Next, with Pajek 4.10 software, we processed the investment relationship into the 
pattern of a two-node network and then mapped it into a one-node network. Removing 
the isolates, we created a VC syndication network composed of 3,694 VC firms. After 
constructing syndication networks, we selected degree centrality, closeness centrality, 
betweenness centrality, and structural holes as network indicators to outline the social 
capital of VC firms. We obtained 1,115 exit events from 2000 to 2015 and defined six 
indicators to characterize VC firms’ investment performance. Table 1 contains all 
variable definitions, Table 2 shows the General situation of the sample, and Table 3 
summarizes and gives numerical descriptions of these variables.  
Table 1. Definition of variables in the model with expected sign 
Variable name Definition Expected 
sign 
Weighted degree Sum of degrees of each node in co-investment 
network 
 
Closeness Sum of the shortest distances from a node to another 
node in the network 
 
Betweenness Degree of resource control of a node in a network.   
Structural hole Gaps in the social network, measured by constraints  
Investment (total) Sum of investments by each VC (including those 
are not withdrawn) 
Positive 
IPO proportion Ratio of IPO amounts to total exits. Positive 
Weighted book return  Book return weighted by total investment of each 
project 
 
Weighted IRR  Internal rate of return weighted by total investment 
of each project 
 
Investment exited Sum of investment that finally exits Positive 
Exit ratio Ratio of total investment to total investment entered Positive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Sample selection procedure 
Sample period 2000 to 2015 
VC firms  4,985 
Enterprises with VC investment  21,421 
Investment events 40,882 
VC firms in joint investment networks 3,964 
Disclosed exit events 1,115 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the variables  
 Mean Median Std. 
dev. 
Min Max Q1 Q3 
Weighted degree 0.011 0.004 0.047 0.000 0.099 0.003 0.011 
Closeness 0.005 0.002 0.032 0.001 1.000 0.000 0.003 
Betweenness 0.005 0.002 0.032 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.003 
Structural hole 0.381 0.340 0.249 0.000 0.900 0.163 0.720 
Investment (total) 0.024 0.020 0.073 0.000 1.000 0.001 0.043 
IPO proportion 0.848 0.700 0.250 0.003 1.000 0.694 1.000 
Weighted book return  
0.016 0.007 0.045 0.000 1.000 0.004 0.014 
Weighted IRR 0.003 0.002 0.030 0.000 1.000 0.002 0.002 
Investment exited 0.035 0.026 0.042 0.025 1.025 0.025 0.029 
Exit ratio 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.001 
Note: For definitions of the variables, see Table 1. 
 
Empirical Results 
Table 4 summarizes the statistics of latent variables in same-round investment. If 
we compare the results of models 1 and 2, we can see that, in the same investment, 
social capital is deeply dependent on the weighted degree and structural hole. 
Therefore, the latent-variable model recognizes that when the network embeddedness 
index and the structural hole index of VC institutions increases, the social capital of 
venture capital will rise as well. Thus H1 can be tested immediately. Models 1 and 3 in 
Table 4 further indicate that the higher the financial returns, the higher the performance 
of the VC. This confirms H2. In addition, model 4 shows that the relationships heavily 
depend on three variables: structure hole, investment (total), and investment exited. 
This means that structural holes of VC networks can affect social capital, and VC 
performance is determined by investment (total) and investment exited variables. 
Table 4. Results of latent variables in same-round investment 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Social capital      
Weighted degree 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Closeness 0.567*** 
(25.089) 
0.370*** 
(26.178) 
0.572*** 
(24.781) 
0.370*** 
(26.095) 
Betweenness 0.568*** 
(25.110) 
0.371*** 
(26.321) 
0.572*** 
(24.800) 
0.371*** 
(26.237) 
Structural hole 0.578*** 
(25.282) 
 
0.583*** 
(24.950) 
 
Performance     
Investment 
(total) 
1.000*** 
(6.639) 
1.000*** 
(6.675) 
  
IPO proportion 
0.450*** 
(9.298) 
0.447*** 
(9.347) 
1.001*** 
(47.236) 
1.001*** 
(46.762) 
Weighted book 
return  
0.522*** 
(9.024) 
0.522*** 
(9.082) 
1.163*** 
(29.489) 
1.172*** 
(29.936) 
Weighted IRR 
0.428*** 
(9.282) 
0.424*** 
(9.327) 
0.952*** 
(45.574) 
0.950*** 
(44.780) 
Investment 
exited 
0.534*** 
(9.233) 
0.531*** 
(9.284) 
  
Exit ratio 
0.476*** 
(9.262) 
0.473*** 
(9.313) 
1.059*** 
(43.232) 
1.061*** 
(43.226) 
*, ** and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
The performance variable is significantly and positively associated with investment 
variables in the models. These results provide strong evidence that the money invested 
has the most impact on performance in China. Previous studies of Chinese investment 
performance did not recognize the importance of the role of the money invested and the 
weighed book return in their analysis of performance determinants, and thus the results 
of their comparison of investment performance in China may be misleading. With 
respect to other variables, as shown in Figure 5, the investment performance is 
consistent with the IPO proportion and weighted IRR in all three regression models. 
They all have a positive impact on performance. In same-round investment, the average 
coefficient of the weighted book return with performance is 0.844. This result is 
consistent with China’s investment environment, because not all successful exit 
projects are good investments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Results of covariances and variances in same-round investment 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Social capital 
performance 
0.032 0.034 0.014 0.015 
Variance     
Weighted degree 
0.018*** 
(16.314) 
0.003*** 
(10.826) 
0.018*** 
(16.296) 
0.003*** 
(10.785) 
Closeness 
0.001*** 
(14.892) 
0.004*** 
(16.151) 
0.001*** 
(14.746) 
0.004*** 
(16.165) 
Betweenness 
0.001*** 
(14.870) 
0.004*** 
(16.145) 
0.001*** 
(14.725) 
0.004*** 
(16.159) 
Structural hole 
0.001*** 
(14.673) 
 
0.001*** 
(14.533) 
 
Investment 
(total) 
0.259*** 
(16.554) 
0.258*** 
(16.543) 
  
IPO proportion 
0.001*** 
(15.064) 
0.001*** 
(14.569) 
0.001*** 
(14.969) 
0.001*** 
(14.417) 
Weighted book return  
0.006*** 
(16.225) 
0.006*** 
(16.082) 
0.006*** 
(16.198) 
0.006*** 
(16.032) 
Weighted IRR 
0.001*** 
(15.290) 
0.001*** 
(14.924) 
0.001*** 
(15.181) 
0.001*** 
(14.754) 
Investment exited 
0.003*** 
(15.712) 
0.002*** 
(15.395) 
  
Exit ratio 
0.002*** 
(15.506) 
0.002*** 
(15.114) 
0.002*** 
(15.426) 
0.002*** 
(14.974) 
Social capital 
0.024*** 
(10.569) 
0.038*** 
(15.178) 
0.024*** 
(10.466) 
0.038*** 
(15.179) 
Performance 
0.042*** 
(4.517) 
0.042*** 
(4.540) 
0.008*** 
(14.846) 
0.008*** 
(14.819) 
*, ** and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 Table 5 depicts the relationship between social capital and financial performance 
at VC firms with different models. The average relationship is about 0.024, which 
implies a weak relationship between social capital and financial performance. Thus, co-
investment in China does not seem to be guided by rules when choosing syndicate 
members: VC institutions that choose a VC partner have a wide range of technologies, 
a wide range of information, industry expertise, and investment networks. VC 
syndication in China may not receive abundant benefits from their social networks. 
That is why the percentage of syndicate projects declining. 
Table 5 also tells us that the degree in the same-round model has less factor 
loading, direct connections that are all strong ties, is less important than a mix of 
connections. This supports the theory of “informational benefit” in China. Total 
investment in the same-round model has more factor loading in VC firm performance. 
This means that a VC rich in social capital may benefit more in scale than in returns, 
or, on the contrary, scale rather than returns will lead VC firms to have more social 
capital. 
In order to compare our results with those in different-round investment, we 
import the various samples to complete the experiments. As in the analysis above, the 
determinants of social capital are the weighted degree and structural holes in social 
networks. The variable affecting the joint investment relationship in China is deeply 
related to VC firms that have a strong ability to connect to other elements. Tables 6 and 
7 show that investment is critical to VC performance under robust testing. Thus, we 
can confirm the correctness of H1 and H2. 
 
 
 
Table 6. Results of latent variables in different-round investment 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Social capital      
Weighted degree 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Closeness 
0.488*** 
(16.449) 
0.486*** 
(16.530) 
0.494*** 
(16.179) 
0.493*** 
(16.222) 
Betweenness 
0.485*** 
(16.425) 
0.482*** 
(16.505) 
0.491*** 
(16.158) 
0.489*** 
(16.199) 
Structural hole 
0.494*** 
(16.473) 
 
0.499*** 
(16.198) 
 
Performance     
Investment(total) 
1.000*** 
(6.333) 
1.000*** 
(6.345) 
  
IPO proportion 
0.464*** 
(8.867) 
0.463*** 
(8.884) 
1.002*** 
(44.324) 
1.002*** 
(44.123) 
Weighted book return  
0.527*** 
(8.655) 
0.526*** 
(8.673) 
1.141*** 
(29.780) 
1.143*** 
(29.854) 
Weighted IRR 
0.444*** 
(8.856) 
0.443*** 
(8.872) 
0.960*** 
(43.176) 
0.960*** 
(42.991) 
Investment exited 
0.547*** 
(8.824) 
0.546*** 
(8.840) 
  
Exit ratio 
0.514*** 
(8.814) 
0.513*** 
(8.832) 
1.112*** 
(38.909) 
1.112*** 
(38.880) 
*, ** and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
Table 7. Results of covariances and variances in different-round investment 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Social capital 
performance 
0.032 0.033 0.015 0.015 
Variance     
 Estimate Std.Err Z-value P(>|z|) 
Weighted degree 
0.056*** 
(16.449) 
0.056*** 
(16.428) 
0.057*** 
(16.446) 
0.056*** 
(16.421) 
Closeness 
0.001*** 
(14.390) 
0.001*** 
(13.090) 
0.001*** 
(14.297) 
0.001*** 
(12.983) 
Betweenness 
0.001*** 
(14.493) 
0.001*** 
(13.282) 
0.001*** 
(14.399) 
0.001*** 
(13.172) 
Structural hole 
0.001*** 
(14.270) 
 
0.001*** 
(14.198) 
 
Investment 
(total) 
0.238*** 
(16.552) 
0.237*** 
(16.549) 
  
IPO proportion 
0.001*** 
(15.011) 
0.001*** 
(14.886) 
0.001*** 
(14.906) 
0.001*** 
(14.766) 
Weighted book 
return  
0.005*** 
(16.140) 
0.005*** 
(16.097) 
0.005*** 
(16.102) 
0.005*** 
(16.051) 
Weighted IRR 
0.001*** 
(15.195) 
0.001*** 
(15.087) 
0.001*** 
(15.073) 
0.001*** 
(14.944) 
Investment 
exited 
0.002*** 
(15.541) 
0.002*** 
(15.452) 
  
Exit ratio 
0.002*** 
(15.613) 
0.002*** 
(15.525) 
0.002*** 
(15.540) 
0.002*** 
(15.438) 
Social capital 
0.030*** 
(7.591) 
0.030*** 
(7.622) 
0.029*** 
(7.482) 
0.030*** 
(7.499) 
Performance 
0.035*** 
(4.323) 
0.035*** 
(4.331) 
0.008*** 
(14.647) 
0.008*** 
(14.633) 
*, ** and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 Another question is whether the VC network really has meaning and whether 
network embeddedness will help VC investment and value-added services, making the 
project more likely to obtain better financial performance. As Tables 6 and 7 show, in 
different-round investment, VC firms’ performance likely does not depend on their 
social capital, which may lead to the decline of VC syndication in China. One 
interesting phenomenon is that, in different-round investment, some variables may not 
have a major influence on the relationship between social capital and financial 
performance at VC firms. Indeed, for risk control purposes, VC firms have become 
more careful in different-round investment, and their investment decisions may change 
compared to those in same-round investment.  
Conclusion 
Using a latent-variable model, we build three hypotheses about the relationships 
between social capital and VC performance in China. We find that the degree-centrality 
embeddedness in co-investment social network is much more important than other 
embeddedness variables in social capital that lead to VC success. Total investment 
(total scale of funds) is much more important than other performance variables. The 
explicit number of social relations and local embeddedness of a VC firm have a higher 
factor loading of real effective social relations. VC success brought about by social 
capital is mainly reflected in the correlation with VC’s investment scale, rather than 
financial returns. Every variable indicates that, in China, social capital that leads to 
success is not about the actual performance of the best VC firms, but how good they 
appear to be. This may not be intentional but, rather, be due to information asymmetry. 
Social capital has a weak relationship with VC firm success, although VC firm 
success owes more to fund size than to IPO or better returns. Chinese data on the 
relationship between social capital and VC firm success does not clearly support the 
logic that social capital contributes to the exit rate of VC IPOs or the rate of returns. It 
may be caused by other factors, such as economies of scale. It is also possible that VC 
firm success (on the surface) creates more social capital (with more connections). In 
conclusion, Chinese VC firms operate imperfectly. Although Chinese VC is one of the 
largest markets in the world, it remains young and immature. This may be why the 
percentage of VC syndicated is slowly decreasing in China, giving way to what really 
matters. 
This paper does not directly consider specialization among VC institutions. The 
degree of concentration of VC institutions, that is, the extent to which a VC institution 
deals with a particular industry, may produce more specialized knowledge, which gives 
one VC firm an advantage over others. More importantly, the utility of expertise comes 
not from social capital but the mutual benefit of cooperation, which is embodied in 
network embeddedness. Therefore, it is not very meaningful to discuss the 
professionalism of individual VC firms. 
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